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Summary findings
Sri Lanka has had double-digit unemployment  rates for  activities arc greater than they should he, bccauise  of
more than a decade. And by 1990, 85 percent  of the  protection.  Rama concludes that it is necessary to repcx
unemployed had spent morE than a year searching for a  the Termination  of Ermplovmcnt  of Workmen Act to
job. Rama ana!yzes whether  high unemployment  rates  avoid the massive destruction of jobs in those activities,
and long spells of unemployment are the result of  should foreign trade be further  liberalized. Many firms
profuse legislation of the labor market or of market  the protected sectors would have to restructure and shut
imperfections that would have prevailed even without  down sorne of their product lines. By being prevcntted
government intervention,  from doing so, these firms rnight just go bankrupt,  and
He shows that not all of the labor market regulations  many more jobs would be lost as a result.
currently in force are highly distortive. Despite minimum  Relaxing restrictions on retrenchment would
wages set by wage boards, and despite collective  unambiguously increase the turnover rate, says Rama.
bargaining, real wages are neither too high nor too rigid.  There would be both more hiring and more firing. The
And despite the freedom of unions, labor relations are  unemployment rate would increase in the short run bLut
peaceful in the private sector.  the average spell of unemployment would be shorter.
A mismatch of skills is only marginally relevant, says  This would help solve the explosive problem of
Rama. Unemployment is better understood  as the  unemployed youths.
outcome of job search in a significantly heterogeneous  This conclusiorn  does not apply to tea plantations,
job market.  given the few alternative sources of employment for thc
It is worth  remembering that Sri Lanka is a partially  Indian Tamil workers and given ethnic obstacles to their
closed economy, in which many import-competing  labor mobility.
This paper  - a product  of the  irade Policy )ivision, Policy  Research  l)ep.artmcnt  --  is part of a larger effort in the dLpartmilet
to understand  the impact  of labor  market  policies and institutions  on economiiic  performiance. ( opics of thc  paper are available
free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washinigton,  1D 2043 . Please  contact Patricia  Cook, room NS-057, cxtcinsio
33902 (28 pages). March 1994.
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In spite of a per capita output of 500 dollars per year, Sri Lanka has social indicators which
compete  with, and sometimes  even  exceed, those of high-income  developing  countries. This outstanding
achievement  reflects  a long lasting concern  for human  development  and equity, which has also permeated
labor market policies  and regulations. Sri Lanka has indeed  ratified  29 International  Labor Office (ILO)
conventions, about twice as many as its neighboring East Asian countries.  Thus, features such as
stringent  legal restrictions  on firing, wage  bargaining  mechanisms  involving  the main  social  partners, and
a multiplicity  of training programs by government  agencies  characterize  the labor market.
Meanwhile, labor market developments  are highly relevant in terms of social and political
stability. The unemployment  rate has exceeded  14%  since 1980, which is high by international  standards.
More importantly,  exit rates out of unemployment  are very low, as suggested  by the fact that in 1990,
85% of the unemployed  had spent more than one year searching for a job.1  Such extremely long
unemployment  spells have been at the roots of two violent uprisings by educated youth, in 1971 and
1987-89.  Although the methods used by the government to  crush the insurrection might act as a
deterrent, some fear that there will be similar  uprisings in the near future if nothing  is done to stimulate
job creation.
This paper analyzes the reasons for high unemployment  in Sri Lanka.  Is it related to the
profusion  of labor market policies  and regulations,  or to labor market imperfections  which would prevail
even in the absence  of any government  intervention? If policies  and regulations  are to blame, which of
them are really harmful and which are not? Put differently: do long unemployment  spells result from
wage rigidity, from constraints  on firing, from both, or from neither? Are there any complementarities
between  government  interventions  into the labor market  on the one hand, and labor market imperfections
on the other hand? For instance, do training programs  actually  help matching  vacancies  and candidates?
To answer these questions,  it is necessary  to understand  how the Sri Lankan  labor market works.
Section 2 of the paper provides a brief presentation  of the institutional  framework, with the different
nature of the regulations  and the uneven extent of labor mobility  leading to the identification  of three
I Unless otherwise specified, all labor market figures are from the 1980-81  Labor Force and Socio-
Economic  Survey, the 1981 Census  of Populaton, the 1981-82  Consumer  Finance  and Socio-Economic
Survey, the 1985-1986  Labor Force and Economic  Survey, and the 1990, 1991 and 1992  Labour Force
Surveys, by the Department  of Census  and Statistics, Colombo.
Idistinct  labor market  segments. Section  3 analyzes  whether  labor costs  are excessively  high, and whether
real wages are excessively rigid.  Since neither of these two appears to be the explanation  for high
unemployment,  section  4 makes  a critical review  of other widely  accepted  explanations,  and suggests  that
Sri Lankan unemployment  may better understood as the product of job search in a context of job
heterogeneity. Section 5 puts the main findings  together by means of a simple efficiency-wage  model,
which is used to assess the effects  of changes  in labor market regulations. Section  6 discusses  the policy
implications  of the analysis.
2.  A Segmented  Labor  Market
The Sri Lankan labor market can be described in terms of segmentation,  by considering  three
different  sectors: tea plantations,  activities  in which labor  market  regulations  are enforced  (the 'regulated'
sector  hereafter)  and activities in which they are not (the 'non-regulated'  sector). Note  that although  tea
plantations  formally belong ts the regulated  sector, it is better to treat them separately,  be-ause of their
very specific  features.
a)  The Plantation  Sector
In the tea sector, 22 management  companies  provide employment  to 0.4 million  Tamil workers
(roughly 7% of total employment  in Sri Lanka). With their families,  they represent  a resident  population
of about  one million  people. Tamil workers  were originally  brought  from India  by the British  during the
colonial period, and they acquired Sri Lankan citizenship  only in recent years.  Fears of ethnic clashes
between  the Sinhalese  majority  of the country  and its Tamil  minority  discourage  the geographical  mobility
of tea workers out of the plantation area.  However, Sri Lankan citizenship  of Indian Tamils gave
significant  political leverage to the most powerful trade union in the area, the Sri Lankan Workers
Congress, whose leader was elected  to the cabinet.
With the exception  of a few estates, tea plantations  are over-staffed.  This is the result of a
generous biring of workers' children  and little replanting  investment  after plantations  were nationalized,
in 1970.  In fact, investment  went down even before 1970, since British managers were aware of the
2nationalization  prospects. 2 As a result, the Sri Lankan  share  of the world  market  for tea declined  to
about  10%,  down  from  nearly  40%  at independence.  Such  a disrmal  performance  started  to be reversed
in 1992,  when  an agreement  was reached  for privatizing  the management  of the estates. So far, this
process has involved  20-year  contracts,  which is not enough  for investments  in replantation  to be
profitable.
New  managers  were  required  to provide  job security,  in spite  of the over-staffing  problem. Job
security  was given  in exchange  for support  by the Sri Lankan  Workers  Congress  to the privatization
process. Dismissals  on disciplinary  grounds  are allowed  (actually,  more  than  30 foremen  out of nearly
250 were fired by the new managers),  but there can be no staff retrenchment  for economic  reasons.
Moreover,  after  management  was transferred  to the private  sector,  the government  continued  to decide
on wages,  which  were  raised  by 30%  in the first quarter  of 1993,  in excess  of an annual  inflation  rate
of 13%. In addition,  the government  is trying  to force  the new  managers  to guarantee  a minimum  of 6
days  of work  per week  whatever  the season,  as first stated  by the Estate  Labour  (Indian)  Ordinance  of
1889.
b)  The Regulated  Sector
Tle regulated  sector  covers  roughly  one  fourth  of Sri Lankan  jobs: about  0.7 mnillion  of them  are
in central  and  local  government,  while  the rest (0.9  million)  are in private  firmns  and  state  corporations. 3
The  public  sector  is characterized  by job security.  However,  employment  in state  industries  has slightly
declined  over time as a result  of privatization  and severance  pay programs  (see Fiszbein,  1992). As
regards  private  firms  in the  regulated  sector,  they  have  to comply  with  a profuse  and  intricate  set  of labor
legislation,  whose  first layers can be traced  to the colonial  period. This legislation  concerns  social
security  contributions  (to  be analyzed  in section  3.a), firing  restrictions  and wage  setting  mechanisms.
Firing restrictions  are set by the Industrial  Disputes  Act (IDA) and the Termination  of
Employment  of Workmen  Act (TMA). The former,  which  regulates  disciplinary  dismissals,  does not
2 For an overview  of recent  economic  history  in Sri Lanka,  see  Cuthbertson  and  Athukorala  (1991),  and
Bruton  (1992).
3 The number  of government  employees  comes  from  the 1990  Census  of Public  Sector  and Corporation
SeciorEmploymet,  Department  of Census  and  Statistics,  Colombo.  The  employment  estimate  for  private
firms  and  state  corporations  is the  number  of active  accounts  with  the Employees  Provident  Fund,  minus
employment  in tea plantations.
3put unreasonable  constraints  on private sector firms.  Managers  usually complain  about the time length
of the review process by the Commissioner  of Labour (about one year), not about its fairness.  The
TWA, in turn, prevents any retrenchment  on non-disciplinary  grounds  without  the written consent  of the
displaced  workers in firms with 15 or more personnel. Since consent  requires  generous severance  pay,
the TWA  is seen as a major constraint  by private firms (Levv, 1993, and World Bank, 1993b).
Firms that attempted  to discontinue  part or all of their operations  without  the workers' consent
were forced to back off by the Commissioner  of Labour, who imposed  compensation  anounts equivalent
to several  yearly wages  per worker. The review  process  generally  took several  years, during which firms
had to keep paying the wage bill.  As a result, in 1991  (the last year for which data are available),  only
65 firms used this institutional  mechanism  to set compensation  packages. Reallocation  to other branches
or production lines and natural attrition were preferred as devices to scale employment  down when
severance  pay was out of reach.
As regards wage  bargaining,  there are two different  institutional  arrangements. On the one hand,
37 tripartite Wage Boards set minimum wages for each skill level in all sectors of the economy.
Delegates to these Boards are chosen from among  active sectoral guilds of private employers  and major
sectoral trade unions by the Commissioner  of Labour.  Once these delegates reach an agreement, it
becomes enforceable for all firms in the corresponding  sector, including state corporations.  In other
words, nation-wide  minimum  wages  arise from tripartite  negotiation. Although  these wages  are relatively
low (see section 3.a), they are used as a reference  to adjust  the wages of most workers.
On the other  hand, firms and unions  may have  their own collective  bargaining  agreements,  which
usually set wages above the Boards' minima in exchange  for labor peace.  A typical example is the
agreement  between  some fifty firms represented  by the Employers' Federation  of Ceylon  and the Ceylon
Mercantile  Workers Union.  This agreement  includes  the "2 for 1" indexation  clause, which means  that
wages have to increase by 2 rupees for each additional  point of the cost-of-living  index. It is only very
recently  that productivity  has started to be considered  as a determinant  of wage increases  in Sri Lankan
collective  bargaining.
c)  The Non-Regulated  Sector
The rest of the Sri Lankan  workers (slightly  fewer than 4 million  people)  are in the non-regulated
sector.  The extent of the latter is not surprising in a country where more than 70% of the population
lives in rural areas.  However, the non-regulated  sector also includes  some urban private firms.  Some
4of them are not covered by specific  pieces  of legislation  concerning  firms above  some size threshold  only.
For instance, firms with fewer than three employees  do not have to pay social security contributions.
Similarly,  the TWA does not apply to firms with fewer than 15 workers.  Some other funis belong to
the non-regulated  sector just because  they do not comply with the legislation. 4
More interestingly,  there are firms which get an implicit "waiver" from the Commissioner  of
Labour.  This is what happens in the Export Processing  Zones (EPZ), where many foreign companies
use the threat of discontinuing  their activities  in the country to get a more flexible application  of labor
legislation. In fact, given  that petitions  to the Commissioner  of Labour are usually  made by union leaders
on behalf of workers, these firms use the security controls  at the entrance of tne EPZ as a device to get
rid of union activists. Consequently,  EPZ firms are union free, in sharp contrast with most firms in the
regulated  sector.
3.  Wage Level and Flexibility
Pervasive labor market regulation raises the issue whether high unemployment  in Sri Lanka
results from policy-induced  rigidities. It has indeed  been argued  that labor costs are excessively  high by
international  staDdards,  that nominal wages  are fully indexed  to the cost of living, that their adjustment
is inflationary  because it leads to a wage push, and that there is a leadership  of public sector wages for
a significant  component  of wage earners (see for instance Kelly, 1992). This section aims at assessing
these  hypotheses.
a)  Wage and Non-Wage  Costs
There is anecdotal  evidence  that most private firms in the regulated  sector pay above the minima
set by the Wage  Boards, except  for trainees. Interviews  of firm managers  by the author and other World
Bank staff during the summer of 1993, within  the context  of a Private Sector  Assessment  (World Bank,
1993b), suggest  that the average earnings  is about  two dollars a day.  Roughly  the same figure emerges
4 Non-ompliance does not seem to be achieved  by being on the fringe of the law (e.g. by hiring casual
workers  rathet than permanent  ones), but rather by being  out of it.
5from household  surveys (Kelly, 1993b),  as well as from the international  comparison  carried out by the
Foreign Investment  Advisory  Service  of the Multilateral Investment  Guarantee  Agency. This comparison
is reported In Table 1, columnn  (b), which shows that the average wage in Sri Lanka is similar to those
In other highly regulated  South Asian countries,  but lower than those in much more flexible  East Asian
countries (the extent of regulation is summarized  in column (a)).
(Insert Table 1)
Monthly wages are only one component  of labor costs.  For a sound international  comparison,
It Is also necessary to take into account labor productivity,  working time and non-wage costs.  Labor
productivity  can be proxied  by the mean years of schooling  of adult population. This variable, reported
In column (c), shows that education levels are much higher in Sri Lanka than in other South Asian
countries, and that they even exceed those of many  neighboring  East Asian countries. It could  be argued
that schooling  is not the same as human  capital, which is true, but schooling  is still highly relevant for
both the work ethic and the ability to acquire new skills.
Labor productivity  can  also be assessed  by comparing  across countries  the value  added  per worker
in man:ifacturing. As for the mean years of schooling,  ',his  is only a proxy, to the extent that the sectoral
structure of  manufacturing  output, hence the average capital-to-labor  ratio, varies from country to
country.  Column (d) shows that the value added per worker in manufacturing  is much higher in Sri
Lanka than in Bangladesh  or India.  The figure is similar to that of Indonesia,  but lower than those of
other East Asian countries and Pakistan.
The international  comparison  is less favorable  to Sri Lanka  as regards working  time. The number
of days of annual leave does not exhibit  a great variance  across the countries  in rable 1 (see column  (e)),
but Sri Lankan workers enjoy  a much  higher number  of paid public holidays. This is because  of the full-
moon Poya Days observed  by the Buddhist  population. The working  time gap is not evident  in household
survey  data though. According  to column  (g) in Table 1, the average  number  of hours of work per week
in manufacturing  is roughly the same in Sri Lanka as in the reported East Asian countries. 5
Finally, non-wage costs are usually  associated  with social security contributions. In Sri Lanka,
contributions by  employers and employees to  both the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) and the
5 Accordingly, hours-based under-employment  does not appear to be an acute problem (see Bowen,
1990). But note that the high number of working hours may be a reaction  to the TWA, which makes
hiring less attractive compared  to paying overtime.
6Table  I
LABOR  COSTS
(a)  Cb)  (c)  td)  te)  Ct)  (g)  (h)  tI)
Wurber  Monthly  Mean  MonthLy  AnnuAl  Paid  hours  of  social  Funding
of ILO  wage  of  years  of value  added Leave  in  public  work  per  security  of  the
conven-  factory  schooling  par worker manufac-  holidays  week  In  contribu-  old-age
tion!  workers  (saes  25  in  manuf.  turing  in  mnu-  manufac-  tion (S  benefit
ratified  (U.S.$)  and  over)  (U.S.0)  (days)  facturing  turing  of wage)  systm
Bangladesh  31  40.2  2.0  168.4  12  10  n.a.  0.0  No benefits
India  36  66.1  2.2  212.2  12  8  46.2  24.6  Funded
PakIstan  30  54.1  1.7  544.3  14  10  n.S.  12.0  Pay-ae-you-go
SRI LAWKA  29  40.3  5.5  296.5  14  22  49.5  23.0  Furnded
Indonesia  10  39.6  3.1  320.5  12  11  na.  10.0  Funded
Malaysia  23  276.8  4.0  864.3  9  0  n.s.  22.3  funid.C
PhiLlipines  23  82.8  6.6  500.5  15  11  48.8  11.9  Pay-as-you-go
Thailand  11  133.7  3.5  n.a.  6  13  50.5  3.2  Ho benefits
Sources:  (a):  World  Labour  Reoort,  International  Labor  Office,  as of 1992. (b):  World  Bank,  Foreign  Investment
Advisory  Service,  MIGA,  as of 1991. (c):  Human  Develorment  aReort, United  Watfons  Development
Programme, as  uf  1980.  (d):  Industrial  Statstics  Yearbook,  United  Nations,  as of 1986-88. (e)  end
(f):  Conditions  of  Work:  a  Cumulativej0Toest,  International  Labor  Office,  as  of 1983,  and  S.R.  de  SiLva
(1990) Leave Holidays  and  Overtime_in  the  Private  Sector,  The  Employers'  Federation  of Ceylon.
Public  holidays  in  Sri  Lanka  incLude  9  mandatory  days,  3 customary  full  days,  2  customary  half  days  and
an  average  of  9 full-moon  Poye  days.  (9):  Yearbook  of  Labour  Statistics,  InternationaL  Labor  Office,
figur.s  are  averages  for  1986-90. (h)  and (i):  Social  Security  Proarams  Throuchout  the  World,  U.S.
Social  Security  Administration,  as  of 1991.Employees  Trust Fund (ETF) amount to 23% of wages. This figure is relatively  high by international
standards (see column (h) in Table 1).  However, old-age benefits are supposed  to be equal to the
capitalized  value of social security contributions. The latter can thus be perceived  as a partial substitute
for current wage earnings. 6 This is not the case in pay-as-you-go  systems,  where contributions  represent
a tax on labor (see columr (i) in Table 1).
b)  Labor Conflicts
Although labor costs do not appear to be excessive, private firms could be reluctant to hire
because  of highly disruptive  labor relations. Aggressive  unions and wildcat  strikes would indeed lower
labor demand, even at moderate  labor costs.  Yet, the labor market is relatively  peaceful in Sri Lanka.
As shown in Figure 1, there was a gradual  weakening  of the labor movement  during the last decade. The
number of unions registerad with the Commissioner  of Labour has been declining since 1977.  The
number  of union members,  which  has a larger variance  because  of arrears in the payment  of dues, started
declining in 1983.7
(Insert Figure 1)
The main reason for this weakening  seems to be political.  Many urions are close to left-wing
parties, and particularly to the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP), under whose government most
nationalizations  took place.  The SLFP was defeated  in 1977  and in subsequent  elections. In addition,
it has greatly suffered from the collapse of communism,  and so did the labor movement. The ruling
United National Party (UNP) has tried to encourage  trade unions under its influence, which are more
moderate  than the left-wing  ones. However, the workers' support  of these unions  has been partly eroded
by the privatization  process  of the last three years.
Whatever  the cause  for the unions' weakening,  firms in the private sector do not face significant
costs in terms of labor conflicts.  At a firs: glance, Figure 2, which reports the number of strikes per
6 It must be noted, however, that there was a recent attempt  to switch to a pay-as-you-go  system in Sri
Lanka.  The attempt was unsuccessful,  but it might have had an impact on expectations. If employees
do not expect to recover the contributions,  then the latter do not represent  a delayed  payment anymore,
no matter what today's law states.
7 Figures in the early 1990s  correspond  to a membership  rate of about  20%, relative  to total employment,
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Source: Department  of  Laboryear, may suggest  the opposite. However,  this apparent  contradiction  is explained  by the fact  that strikes
ae  a frequent  occurrence  of labor relations in tea plantations. The gap between the two lines in Figure
2 shows  that the number  of labor conflicts  In the private sector is extremely  moderate. In fact, less than
0.5% of all private sector workers went on strike in any recent year.'
(Insert Figure 2)
C)  Wage Flexibility
Even If labor costs are not too high and labor conflicts  are not too frequent, private firms could
still be unale  to adjust wages when facing unexpected  shocks.  Minimum  wages set by Wage Boards,
or credible  strike threats by unions, could indeed  lead to real wage rigidity. Tle flexibility  issue can be
addressed by using time series for the average nominal wage, the consumer  price index and a selected
monetary policy instrument,  such as the money  supply or the exchange  rate.  But before turning to the
analysis,  it is worth discussing  what the data should  look like depending  on whether  real wages are rigid
or flexible.
Three stylized facts characterize a  'rigid"  economy.  First, nominal wages are indexed to
consumer  prices, with an indexation  coefficient  close  to 100%. Indeed, if the indexation  coefficient  was
lower, then there would always  be room to reduce real wages  in an inflationary  economy. Second, wage
increases  lead to a cost push, so that they reinforce inflation. If firms could not pass higher wages into
prices, then they would not be able to afford full indexation  for long periods of time.  And third, the
depreciation  of the domestic  currency aims at preserving  the country's competitiveness. If this was not
the case, then firms in the tradeable sector would  eventually  be squeezed  by the wage-price  spiral.
The stylized facts are at odds in a "flexible"  economy. First, there is less than full indexation
of nominal wages  to the consumer  price index. If wage increases  always  matched  price increases  in the
short run, then they would  not be reflecting  any labor market  specific  shocks. Second, inflation  rates are
closely  related to monetary policy, not to production  costs.  If for any reason nominal wages increased
too much, then competition  at home and abroad  would put the burden of adjustment  on profit margins.
I This assessment is consistent  with firm survey findings, according  to which labor relations represent
a  mild constraint, the seventh less severe out of a list of 33 potential constraints to private sector
development  (World Bank, 1993b).
8Figure 2
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Source: Department  of  LaborAnd third, monetary policy is exogenous,  in the sense that it is not a mere adjustment  of the authorities
to a wage-price  spiral beyond their control.
The reported stylized facts correspond to very unrealistic pure cases.  Actual economies lie
somewhere  between these two extremes.  The interesting  thing is that Sri Lanka is much closer to the
"flexible"  case than it is to the "rigid" case.  This is shown by Table 2, which reports the results of a
one-lag  vector auto-regression  on quarterly  data for period 1987-1993.  The endogenous  variables  are the
percent variation of the Colombo  consumers' price index, the percent variation  of the average minima
set by Wage Boards, and the percent depreciation of the rupee against the dollar. 9 The exogenous
variables are the annual growth rate of real output and four dummies  which account for two jumps in
economic  policy (a large devaluation  in 1989  and a significant  adjustment  of public sector  wages  in 1993)
and two inflation  outliers.
(Insert Table 2)
According  to the results in Table 2, the inflation  rate in quarter t reacts to the depreciation  rate
in quarter t-l  (the corresponding  coefficient, equal to 0.247, is statistically  significant),  but it is not
sensitive  at all to wage increases  in t-1.  Inflation is thus associated  with monetary  policy, not with cost
push.  Similarly, wage increases appear to be indexed to the inflation rate in t-1, but the indexation
coefficient (0.872) is less than one.10 Estimates  to be discu.ssed  in section 4.d,  which are based on
panel data for wage increases  at the sectoral level and which further control for the unemployment  rate,
suggest that the indexation coefficient  is even lower than indicated in Table 2 (possibly  around 0.7).
Finally, the depreciation rate in t  aims at partially offsetting inflation and depreciation in t-l  (the
corresponding coefficients are -0.330 and -0.170), not at preserving competitiveness.  Tlerefore,
monetary policy appears to be exogenous,  rather than accommodating.
9 Using the percent variation of money supply (M2) instead of the depreciation  rate greatly reduces the
fit of the model, which is not surprising in a context of managed float.  Intervention  in the foreign
exchange  market implies indeed that money  supply is not controlled  by the government  anymore.
10 This result is consistent  with the stagnation  (or even drop) of real wages in the last decade.
9Table 2
WAGE  FLEXIBILITY
(Based  on quarterLy  data)
Endogenous  Inflation  Wage  Depreciation
variable  rate  increase  rate
2
in  t  in  t-1  in  t-1  in  t-I  i
Inflation  rate  (in  %)  -0.112  -0.043  0.247  *
0.534
based  on Colombo  CPI  (-0.639)  0.307)  (3.047)
Wage  Increase (in  m)  0.872  *  0.083  -0.112
0.642
based  on Wage  Boards  (3.951)  (0.474)  (-1.102)
Depreciation  rate  (in  X),  -0.330  *  0.140  -0.170  *
0.875
based on Rupees/DoLlar  (-1.859)  (0.996)  (-2.069)
Note: Data are from the Monthv  lulLetin,  Central  Bank  of  Sri  Lanka, Coloaro,
many  issues.  Because  of  data availability,  the  sanple  has 24
observations,  from 1987.2  to  1993.1.  Coefficients  are from a  vector
auto-regression  with  one lag,  controlling  for  the  annual growth rate  of
GDP. Dummies  were used for  the  large  devaluation  in  the  third  quarter
of  1989,  the  wage  Increase  in  the  first  quarter  of  1993,  and two
inflation  ouliers  (1988.1  and 1990.1).  t-statistics  are  shown  in
parenthesis.  Significant  coefficients  at  the  5  level  are  indicated
by one asterisk.d)  Goverarnment  Leadership
Private sector wages could  be rigid not because  of indexation  to the consumer  price Index, but
because  of indexation  to government  wages. If this was so, labor costs would  be driven  away from their
fmndamentals  by wage leadership. This possibility  is analyzed  in Table 3, which presents the correlation
coefficient  between  annual wage increases  in the private sector and wage increases  in govermnent,  both
in the same year and with a one-year lag, over period 1980-1992. For private sector wages, seven
variables were considered.  Three of them are the averages of minima set  by Wage Boards for
agriculture, manufacturing  and services,  so that they correspond  to the regulated  sector. The remaining
four are the sectoral averages  of actual  wages in non-regulated  tea, paddy and rubber plantations,  as well
as in non-regulated  construction. 1I
(Insert Table 3)
According  to Table 3, there is no clear evidence  of a wage leadership  by the government. Wage
increasa  in  regulated manufacturing activities and in  the four non-regulated activities exhibit no
significant  correlation with wage increases in the government, neither in the same year nor with a one-
year lag. The correlation  coefficient  is positive  in the case of regulated  agriculture  and service  activities,
but this should come as no surprise given that the corresponding  Wage Boards include many publicly-
owned corporations.  Therefore, it cannot be concluded from Table 3 that bargaining power by civil
servants is a source of rigidity for private sector wages.
4.  The Nature of Unemployment
The fact that wages are not excessively  high ndrjparticularly  rigid makes it difficult  to account
for high unemployment  based on a disequilibrium  between  supply and demand  for labor at the aggregate
See Korale (1987, chapter 3) for a description  of the data sources.
10Table  3
INDEXATION  TO  GOVERWNENT  WAGES
Correlation  coefficient  with
wage  increases  (t)  in  goverr.ent
Sectoral  wage  Increases  (t)  in  the  same  year the  year  before
Agriculture  (Wage  Boards)  0.635 *  -0.231
Ma*iufacturing  (Wage  Boards)  -0.462  0.166
Services  (Wage  Boards)  0.479  *  -0.298
Tea  (ron-regulated  sector)  -0.244  -0.460
ubber  (non-regulated)  0.094  -0.109
Paddy  (non-regulated)  0.180  *0.132
Construction  (non-regulated)  0.072  0.178
Source: Based  on data  from the  tCstishiesl  k1s.ract  of  the
0emocrstie  Sociatlst  A oublic  f riLcJnk.a  Department of
COnsus  and Statistics,  CoLonbo,  for  period  1980-1992.
Significant  coefficients  at  the  5S  Level  are  indicated  by
one asterisk.level.12  It rather suggests that the problem arises from a mismatch between the structures of labor
supply and labor demand.  Actually, the two most popular explanations  for high unemployment  in Sri
Lanka focus on some heterogeneity  of either workers or jobs or both.  This section critically  reviews
these explanations.
a)  Skills Mismatch
Although  Sri Lankan  workers are highly  educated  compared  to other workers  in the region, there
is a widespread  concern that the education  system, with its emphasis  on white collar professions  and
public sector careers, does not fit the needs of the private sector. Put differently,  the Sri Lankan labor
force may be highly educated,  but not particularly  skilled.  Moreover, students are taught in Sinhalese
or Tamil, whereas private firms prefer workers  who are fluent in English. Since  the unemployment  rate
is much  higher for youth than for other groups, the mismatch  between available  and required skills has
been pointed  out as the main cause for high unemployment.
This explanation,  first stated in an ILO study (International  Labor Office, 1971), has been very
influential in terms of labor market policies.  At present, government agencies run more than three
thousand  programs aimed at upgrading  skills.  These programs include in-service  training;  however, in
1992, 23% of the unemployed  reported having taken some kind of vocational  training (Kelly, 1993c).
Altogether,  training expenses  by these  agencies amount  to more than 1  % of GDP (Kelly, 1992). It even
appears that further steps will be taken in the same direction, by creating a Skills Development  Fund
whose annual budget would be in the order of an additional  0.2 to 0.3% of GDP.  Given that training
is supposed  to lead to positive  externalities,  the possibility  of financing  the Fund by a levy on firmns,  such
as a payroll tax, is being considered  (World  Bank, 1993a).
The skills mismatch  hypothesis  appears  to be relevant in the case of college  graduates. Private
sector firms complain  about the lack of good quality high-level  staff, such as managers and engineers.
This shortage is reported as the sixth more severe problem they face, out of a list of 33 potential
constraints  (World Bank, 1993b). There is also anecdotal  evidence  that private firms fear the alleged
12 It could be argued that although wages are flexible, they are not flexible enough to cope with an
increase by nearly one half of female  participation  rates, as the one that took place between 1980  and
1990.  If this hypothesis was correct, then unemployment  would be the temporary outcome of wage
rigidity, and it should be gradually absorbed as female participation  rates stabilize.  However, higher
participation  has been partially offset by migration  to Gulf countries, so that labor supply has increased
by only 2.2% per year over period 1980-1990  (see Alailima, 1991).
11anti-business  bias of college education. They also reject Its emphasis  on liberal arts, which became
evident  in February 1992, when  the government  opened  a register  for unemployed  graduates, and 12,000
people showed  up; of these, more than 60% turned out to be liberal arts graduates  (Kelly, 1993a).
However, by  1990 less than  18% of the unemployed  had  'A'  levels and above, i.e.  had
completed  high school. Therefore, the problems  faced by college  graduates  are not necessarily  those of
the bulk of the unemployed. In fact, private sector firms do not view the shortage  of qualified  labor as
a major obstacle to their development (World Bank, 1993b).1 3 In a recent firm survey (Kelly and
Culler, 1990), 62% of the interviewed  managers  said that workers  knew how to do their  jobs (compared
to 30% who disagreed),  56% said that they were good (whereas 18% said that they were not), and  50%
acknowledged  that there were plenty of good workers available  (while 44% disagreed).
Studies dealing specifically  with the role of education  in explaining  high unemployment  do not
support the skills mismatch  hypothesis either.  Gunatilleke  (1989) compared the oducational  level of
entrants into employment  to the output of the educational system, and concluded that there was no
significant difference between the two.14  A similar conclusion was reached by Dickens and Lang
(1991), who showed  that once sex, sector and age are controlled  for, the relation  between  education  and
unemployment  disappears  for urban youth and is significantly  weakened  for rural youth. In other words,
Sri Lanka  appears  to have youth  unemployment,  rather than educated  youth unemployment. If this is so,
then it is difficult  to blame education  for unemployment.
On the other hand, government  training programs do not seem to be well geared to the needs of
the private  sector. Managers  usually  complain  that these  programs  are not updated, and that the selection
of the trainees is subject to politics and patronage, whereas they acknowledge  that Sri Lankan workers
learn fast.  Not surprisingly,  78% of the companies  surveyed  by Kelly  and Culler (1990)  provided  special
training which was not part of the regular  job.  Two out of three agreed with the following  statement:
When hiring a new employee I don't  really want a worker who is already trained.  Just give me
someone  who is motivated  and disciplined  and I'll teach him what I want him to know'.  Finally, there
appeared  to be no noticeable  skill gap between  already trained  workers and other workers, since 29% of
13  Complains  refer to shortages for very specific skills, such as gem cutting and masonry (because  of
migration  to Gulf countries).
14 Gunatilleke  did not exactly  deal with entrants, but rather with the net change in employment,  i.e. the
difference  between new employment  and retirement.
12the companies ranked the former as being better or much better than the latter, but exactly the same
percentage  said the opposite.
b)  Affording  Unemployment
In the skills mismatch  hypothesis, unemployment  is involuntary:  the unemployed  are willing  to
work at the prevailing  wage rate, but no firm makes  them an offer. This is at odds with either job search
or queuing  hypotheses, in which unemployment  is voluntary: the unemployed  face job offers, but they
rationally prefer not to take them and wait for better ones.  I5 A necessary  condition  for unemployment
to  be  voluntary is  that the unemployed must be  wealthy enough to  afford waiting.  Involuntary
unemployment,  by contrast, should be associated  with significant  dis-saving  when the unemployed  have
some cumulated  wealth, or with poverty  when they have not.
The long unemployment  spells in Sri Lanka make the wealth issue a highly  relevant  one.  In the
early 1980s,  the median  unemployed  person  had indeed  been unemployed  for about  15 months,  and more
than one in ten had been unemployed  for more than four years.  How did all they finance consumption?
Using household  survey data for 1985-86,  Bowen  (1990) showed  that 87.2% of the unemployed  males
and 96.2% of the unemployed  females received  family assistance. Government  assistance,  by contrast,
was almost insignificant,  reaching  only 1.5% of the unemployed  of both sexes. Dis-saving  was relevant
for just 5.2% of the unemployed  males, and irrelevant  for unemployed  females.
These findings, together with the fact that two thirds of the unemployed  never had a job, suggest
that most of the jobless are the children of middle-  or upper-income  families. Figure 3, which reports
the unemployment  rate as a function of monthly  family incomes,  provides support to this hypothesis.1 6
The distribution  in Figure 3 is bi-modal, with a high unemployment  rate at the lowest  income levels, and
a much higher one at high income levels. The first mode probably  reflects involuntary  unemployment,
with low family income being  the result  of a jobless head of household. The second  one, to the contrary,
Is  Note that voluntary  unemployment  is not incompatible  with legitimate  bitterness  by the unemployed
about their fate.  Even if searching  or queuing for a good job is the best choice ex-ante, the ex-post
outcome  may be extremely  disappointing. This is what happens  when no offer for a good  job is received
after several years of either active searching  or patient queuing.
16  The Figure is based on data by Alailima  (1991). It is worth mentioning  that the data show a similar
pattern for both urban and rural areas.
13is likely to reflect a voluntary choice, with the unemployment  of young household members being
afforded  by high family income. 17
(Insert Figure 3)
Studies on poverty in  Sri  Lanka also yield a  picture which is  consistent with voluntary
unemployment. Given the high unemployment  rate and the length of unemployment  spells, if the bulk
of unemployment  was involuntary, then one should expect a strong association between poverty and
joblessness. The labor market characteristics  of the heads of poor households  indicate  that this is not the
case: inadequate  remuneration  appears  to be a more important  factor than unemployment  in explaining
poverty (he  World Bank, 1990, 1992).  In other words, poverty in Sri Lanka is not so much the
consequence  of unemployment  as it is of low wages.
c)  Government  Hiring
Dickens and Lang (1991) blame unemployment  on over hiring practices by the govermnent.
Public sector jobs are usually characterized  by more security, higher benefits, lower effort and more
prestige  than their private sector counterparts. Thus, unemployment  could be generated  by queuing  for
government  jobs.  The reason for the unemployed  not to take other employment  while  queuing  would be
a perceived  or real government  preference  for hiring the unemployed. Dickens  and Lang claim that Sri
Lankan  government  jobs are created  with the  deliberate  purpose  of alleviating  the unemployment  problem.
Under these circumstances,  it would not be surprising  that the unemployed  get priority when filling the
vacancies.
According  to Alailima  (1991), this is not so anymore. Government  recruitment  is done entirely
on the basis of the aggregate  score obtained at a written examination,  with no additional  consideration
given to  prior  experience, employment or unemployment.  Yet the above mentioned register of
unemployed graduates tends to prove the opposite.  Irdeed, the government referred 5,257 of the
registered unemployed  graduates to manpower  placement companies. After six months, only 3% had
actually been placed in private sector firms.  Subsequently,  the government announced  that those who
17  A similar conclusion  was reached by Glewwe  (1987), using household  survey data for 1969-70.
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Source: Based on Alailima  (1991)could not be placed in the private sector would be hired as teachers (Kelly, 1993a). That process is
ongoing.
However, as for the skills mismatch  explanation, the hypothesis that unemployment  is due to
hiring practices by the government does not account for the bulk of the problem.  The register of
unemployed  graduates, for instance, concerns  a few thousand individuals,  in a country  with almost one
million unemployed  people.  More importantly,  the empirical analysis  below (section 4.d) shows that
although the unemployed  do not compete  for jobs in the non-regulated  sector of the economy, they do
compete  for jobs in regulated  private firms and state corporations. Hence  there is active  job search  by
the unemployed,  and not just passive queuing  for government  openings.  18
d)  Job Search
The hypothesis  we want to assess is that the unemployed  are in search of (rationed)  jobs in the
regulated sector of the economy, but are not interested  by (abundant)  jobs in the non-regulated  sector.
A first element  that supports  this hypothesis  is casual  evidence  that employment  opportunities  exist in the
non-regulated  sector.  Several firms in the EPZ located  just a few miles out of Colombo  report excess
demand for labor in the range of many  hundred workers each. This is because  the wages they pay are
not high enough to compensate  for the cost and inconvenience  of public transportation from and to
Colombo. Not surprisingly,  these firms are only able to attract young women from the provinces, and
only to the extent that lodging is provided.
A more rigorous test of the hypothesis  consists  of analyzing  the responsiveness  of sectoral wage
increases  to the unemployment  rate.  If the unemployed  compete  for jobs in the regulated sector of the
economy, then wage increases  in this sector should  be more moderate,  other things equal, the higher the
unemployment  rate.  On the other hand, if the unemployed  do not compete  for jobs in the non-regulated
sector, then high unemployment  should not restrain wage increase  in this sector.  Furthermore, since
a higher unemployment  is associated,  other things equal, with lower manpower  availability  fo'r the non-
Is Hiring practices  may have  an impact  on the structure  of unemployment  though. As indicated  in section
4.a, private sector firms prefer to hire workers with  English  proficiency. This preference  is not generally
due to the requirements  of the job.  There is anecdotal  evidence  that it rather operates as a screening
device for social background  as well as for the quality of formal education.  Other things equal, job
searchers from outside Colombo  tend to be disadvantaged  by the language criterion.  Tberefore, the
preference for English proficiency  has effects which are similar to those of the preference for short
unemployment  spells in industrial  countries (see Blanchard  and Diamond, 1990).
15regulated  sector, wage incraases in this sector could even be an upward function of the unemployment
rate.
The test is carried cut by pooling cross-section  and time-series  data.  The endogenous  variable
is the percent annual wage increase in seven activities,  three of them regulated  and four non-regulated,
over period 1980-1992. The activities are the same as in section 3.d (see Table 3).  The exogenous
variable is the unemployment  rate, in percent. Equation  (1) in Table 4 uses the contemporary  economy-
wide unemployment rate for  all the seven activities.  Equation (2) uses the contemporary urban
employment  rate for manufacturing  and services  in the regulated  sector, as well as for construction  in the
non-regulated  sector, whereas it uses the contemporary  rural unemployment  rate for agriculture in the
regulated sector, and for tea, paddy and rubber plantations  in the non-regulated  sector. Both equations
control for the contemporary  inflation rate, measured as the percent annual change of the Colombo
consumers'  price index. The estimation  allows  for a variable  slope across  sectors in the case of both the
inflation  rate and the unemployment  rate, as well as for a variable intercept.
(Insert Table 4)
According to Table 4,  wage increases are indexed to the inflation rate, with an indexation
coefficient of about 0.7 within the year (0.687 in equation (1), 0.763 in equation (2)).  There is no
significant  difference in the extent of indexation  between the regulated and the non-regulated  sectors
though (the change in slope from non-regulated  to regulated  sectors  is not statistically  significant  in either
of the two equations). As regards the unemployment  rate, if it has any impact  on wage increases  in the
non-regulated  sector, it is a positive  one. The corresponding  coefficient  is indeed  not different  from zero
in equation  (1), but it is statistically  significant  (equal to 1.158) in equation  (2).  The opposite  is true for
wage increases in the regulated  sector. The net coefficient  is -1.574 in equation (1) (=  1.346 - 2.920)
and -0.371 (=  1.158 - 1.529) in equation  (2).  The difference  between  sectors is statistically  significant
in both cases.  Therefore, the data support the hypothesis.
16Table  4
REACTION  OF WAGE INCREASES  TO  UNEMPLOYMENT
Inflation  rate  Total  uneployment  Sectorsl  unemplyt.
Non-reg.  Change  Non-reg.  Change  Non-reg.  Change  2
Eq.  sectors  in  slope  sectors  In  slope  sectors  In  slope  i
0.687  *  -0.193  1.346  -2.920
(1)  0.251
(1.886)  (-0.354)  (1.209)  (-1.753,
0.763 ^  -0.589  1.158  *  -1.529  *
(2)  0.267
(2.739)  (-1.442)  (1.938)  (-1.750)
Note:  The endogenous  variable  is the  annual  growth  rate  of nominal  wages  for
seven  groups  of workers  (three  of them  covered  by Wage  Boards,  four  of
them  belonging  to the  non-regulated  sector),  from  1980  to 1992. The
sample  size  is  49.  Data  are  from  the  Department  of Census  and
Statistics,  the  Department  of Labour  and  the  Central  lank  of Sri  Lanka.
Coefficients  are  based  on ordinary  least  squares,  controlling  for  a
time  trend. t-statistics  are  shown  in  parenthesis.  Significant
coefficients  at  the  5X level  are  indicated  by one  asterisk.5.  A Simple Analytical Model
Findings in the previous sections can be summarized  by means of a simple analytical  model of
the Sri Lankan labor market.  The fact that the market is segmented implies that at least two sectors
(regulated  and non-regulated)  have to be considered  for the model  to be meaningful."9 The flexibility
of wages, in turn, suggests  that it is better not to assume any exogenous  constraint on wage setting by
firms in the regulated sector.  The voluntary nature of unemployment,  finally, means that policy
implications  depend  crucially  on the way the sectoral  job heterogeneity  (and more specifically,  the wage
gap between sectors) is modelled.
a)  Efficiency  Wages
In the development  literature, many reasons have been put forward to explain the wage gap
between the modem (or formal) and the traditional (or informal) sectors of the economy.  One of the
most appealing explanations is related to  efficiency considerations.  Modern activities are usually
characterized by tasks which are more sophisticated  and more difficult to  monitor than traditional
activities. High wages can therefore be used to attract good workers  and to reduce their turnover when
labor quality cannot be directly observed.  High wages can also be used to provide a disincentive  to
shirking, when the only jobs that are immediately  available to a worker who is fired (i.e. jobs in the
traditional sector) are characterized  by low wages.
In Sri Lanka, there is anecdotal  evidence  that private  firms engage  in a 'gift exchange' with their
workers in order to retain them and to get from them the required effort level. Thus, wages significantly
higher than the minima  set by Wage Boards, a personal knowledge  of most of these workers and their
families, gifts on the occasion  of weddings  and other celebrations,  free meals and a flexible  leave policy
appear to  be standard in labor relations.  On the other hand, high unemployment  rates and long
unemployment  spells are likely to act as a powerful deterrent for shirking.  However, the approach  is
different in some of the EPZ firms, where the required effort level is extracted by means of tough
discipline  and a close monitoring  of the tasks performed  by workers.
19  Since  there is almost  no labor mobility  between  tea estates and the rest of the economy,  the plantation
sector can be treated separately without  any loss of generality.
17A simple way to model  these efficiency  considerations  is the one by Shapiro and Stiglitz  (1984)
and Bulow and Summers (1986), who focus on the combination  of high wages and a credible threat of
being fired if caught shirking as a discipline  device. Their model abstracts  from other consequences  of
high wages, such as attracting  better workers,  reducing  turnover, and improving  morale. It also abstracts
from any bargaining power by insiders in the wage setting process.  While these simplifications  allow
analytical  tractability, they do not seem excessively  unrealistic in the case of Sri Lanka.  Particularly,
because  of the labor movement  weakening,  Sri Lankan  trade unions seem to be more relevant in terms
of enforcing  labor regulations  (such as the IDA and the TWA) than in terms of negotiating  wages.
b)  Workers' Decisions
Assume  firms in the non-regulated  sector (N, hereafter) do not face any cost in extracting  the
required effort level (say, e) from their workers, either because  the tasks are not too sophisticated,  or
because  these firms can resort to disciplinary  methods  which not available  to regulated  firms. Therefore,
the effort level is e whatever the wage level WN.  In the regulated  sector (R), by contrast, a minimum
wage WR is needed to induce workers to provide  the effort level e.  For simplicity, it is assumed  that
workers  provide no effort at all when wages  are below  WR.
How is this critical wage level determined? If wages were exactly equal to WR, then workers
would be indifferent  between providing  the effort e or no effort at all.  In the second case, they would
not experience  any disutility  from working, but they would face the risk of being fired for disciplinary
reasons. Note that for the firing threat to operate as an effort incentive,  the utility of being unemployed
has to be lower than the utility  of being employed  in sector R.  Note also that in a context of voluntary
unemployment,  the utility  of being  unemployed  is the same as the utility  of being employed  in sector N,
where jobs are not rationed.
The discussion  in the above  paragraph  allows  writing  the no-shirkdng  condition  as in equation  (3).
The left-hand  side of this equation represents  the expected  utility of a hard-working  employee  in sector
R.  Assuming  no risk aversion,  this expected  utility is a weighted  average  of the utility  of being employed
in sector R and the utility of being unemployed  (or, equivalently,  of being employed in sector N) with
weights are l-r  and r,  where r represents the probability  of being fired for non-disciplinary  reasons.
Given that sector R is subject  to the TWA, this probability  is very small (r  m 0).  For simplicity,  utility
is supposed  to be proportional  to the difference  between  income and effort level.
is(1-r)(WR-e)  +  r(WN-e)  a  (l-f)(1-r)WR  +  11  - (1-f)(1-r)](WN-e)  (3)
Thc right-hand  side of equation  (3), in turn, represents  the utility  of a shirking  employee  in sector
R.  Now, the probability  of keeping the job is lower than in the former paragraph, because in addition
to facing the probability  r of being fired for non-disciplinary  reasons, the shirking employee  faces the
probability f of being fired for disciplinary  reasons.  In Sri Lanka, the IDA does not put excessive
restrictions  on disciplinary  firing, so that it can be accepted  that f is strictly positive. The counterpart
of the lower probability  of keeping  the  job is a higher utility  from being employed  in sector R, since  the
wage is still WR but the effort level is zero instead  of e.
Equation (3) yields:
1-f
WR =  WN +  -*'  (4)
f
Tle sectoral wage gap thus depends on the probability  f of being fired for disciplinary  reasons when
shirking.  Since monitoring is never perfect (f  <  1), the wage gap is strictly positive.  This gap is a
downward  function  of f, but it does not depend  on the probability  r of facing retrenchment. Therefore,
an increase in r such as the one that would result  from repealing  the TWA should  not affect the sectoral
wage gap.
The hypothesis  that unemployment  is voluntary  implies  that the utility  of being  employed  in sector
N, where jobs are not rationed, is equal to the utility of being unemployed  and in search of a sector R
job.20 This arbitrage  condition  is represented  in equation (5).  The left-hand  side is the utility  of being
employed in sector N, which does not depend  on any firing probability  (neither disciplinary  nor non-
disciplinary),  because dismissed  workers can be immediately  rehired in this sector. The right-hand  side
is the utility level associated  with job search. For simplicity, it is assumed  that the unemployed  have  to
provide no effort and have no income at all.  But the utility level is still positive because there is a
probability  h of getting a jcb in sector R.
WN - e  =  h[  (1-r)(WR-e)  +  r(WN-e)  I  (5)
20 It is implicitly  assumed that job search is not possible while working in sector N.  This may not be
a realistic  assumption,  but it is a standard  one in the job search literature.
19The term in brackets in the right-hand  side of equation  (5), which represents  the utility  of being employed
in sector R, is identical  to the left-hand  side in equation  (3).
After  replacing (5)  into (3), the following  expression  obtains  for the equilibrium  level of WR:
(1-hf)  - (1-f)hr
WR  m  .e  (6)
(1-h)f
By differentiating  equation (6), it can be seen that wages in sector R increase  with the probability  h of
finding a job  and decrease with the probabilities f and r  of being fired for disciplinary and non-
disciplinary  reasons respectively.
c)  Labor Market Equilibrium
Whereas  r and f are exogenous  parameters,  resulting  from labor market regulations,  the exit rate
out of unemployment  h is an endogenous  variable,  resulting  from labor market equilibrium. Let LR and
LN be employment in the regulated and non-regulated  sectors respectively.  Without any loss, the
following  labor demand  schedules  can be assumed:
Li =  1  - Wi  with  i =  R,N  (7)
After normalizing  the labor force to one, the unemployment  rate U can be written as:
U  =  1  - LR  - LN  (8)
In  equilibrium, the unemployment rate  is  constant, which means that  the  flow out  of
unemployment  to sector R equals the flow out of sector R to unemployment. Given that WR is set in
order to elicit the effort level e, all workers in sector R work hara, and there is no firing for disciplinary
reasons.  Therefore, the flow out of sector R to unemployment  is just equal to rLR.  The flow out of
unemployment  to sector R, in turn, is equal to hU.  Equilibrium  thus obtains  for:
rLR  - hU  (9)
Replacing  equations  (4), (7) and (8) into (9) yields the following  expression  for the exit rate out
of unemployment:
20f (1-WR)
h  a  r  (10)
2fWR - f  - (1-f).
By differentiating  equation  (10), It can be seen that the hiring rate h increases  with the probability  r that
sector R workers be fired for non-disciplinary  reasons, and decreases  with both the wage level WR  and
the probability  f that shirking workers  be fired for disciplinary  reasons. Note that when this probability
is close to  zero (r  m 0),  as is the case in Sri Lanka, then there is no hiring either (h  X  0).
Consequently, the average unemployment  spell, which is the inverse of the exit rate h,  tends to
infinite. 21
d)  Comparative  Statics
Equations  (6) and (10) represent a system with two unknowns:  the wage level in the regulated
sector, WR, and the exit rate out of unemployment,  h.  This system can be used to  analyze the
consequences  of more flexible labor market  policies. Particularly, it can be used to assess the effects of
repealing  the most controversial  piece of labor market legislation  in Sri Lanka, namely the TWA.  In
terms of the model, repealing the TWA is equivalent  to increasing  the probability  r of being fired for
non-disciplinary  reasons. The effects are analyzed  graphically  in Figure 4.
(Insert Figure 4)
The upward-sloping  lines in Figure 4, which  correspond  to equation  (6) in the model, summarize
the workers' behavior.  The solid upward-sloping  line obtains for r  = 0, so that it depicts the current
situation in Sri Lanka. The dotted  upward-sloping  line obtains  for r  >  0, and reflects what would  happen
if the TWA were to be repealed. The downward-sloping  curves, in turn, correspond  to equation  (10) and
reflect labor market equilibrium,  in the sense  that they correspond  to a constant  unemployment  rate.  As
before, the solid line obtains for r = 0 and the dotted line for r  >  0.
Repealing  the TWA would thus shift the steady-state  from point  A to point  B in Figure 4.  Since
both the upward-sloping and the downward-sloping  schedules move to the right, the hiring rate h
21 In a more realistic  model, in which some fraction of the workers in sector R would die, retire or quit,
the hiring rate would be strictly positive, thus leading to a finite average unemployment  spell, even for
r=0.
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Wage in the  Regulated Sector  (W)
R
Equation (6)
e/f  |  = 
[f+(E-f)e  /2f
Exit  Rate out  of  Unemployment  (h)unambiguously  increases. Although  the result is a priori ambiguous  for the wage level in the regulated
sector, it is shown in the Appendix  that under the assumptions  of the model, WR increases  too.  Given
that the sectoral wage gap does not depend on r (see equation (4)), the wage level WN in the non-
regulated sector also increases, and so does the unemployment  rate U (see equations (7) and (8)).
Summing up, repealing the TWA would raise the unemployment  rate, but it would also raise the
probability  for each unemployed  person to find a good  job.
6.  The  Policy  Implications
Although  the Sri Lankan  labor market is highly  regulated,  it would be a mistake  to conclude  that
all of the labor market regulations  currently  in force are highly distortive. For instance, it appears  that
in spite of minimum  wages set by Wage Boards and of collective  bargaining between firms and trade
unions, real wages are neither excessively  high nor excessively  rigid. Similarly,  freedom  for trade unions
does not lead to conflictive labor relations nor to wildcat strikes, except in tea plantations  and state
corporations,  where employment  decisions  are basically  political. However,  labor market regulations  do
have a distortive impact in terms of labor mobility. According  to the analysis in this paper, the main
obstacle comes from the TWA.
In this sense, it is worth reminding  that Sri Lanka is a partially closed  economy. Foreign trade
barriers started to be reduced in 1977, but there are still many import-competing  activities which are
much larger than they should be, due to protection. Repealing  the TWA would be a necessary  step to
avoid massive  job destruction  in these activities, in the event of a further liberalization  of foreign trade.
Many firms in the protected  sectors would  have indeed  to restructure  and shut down  some of their product
lines. By being  prevented  to do so, these firms may  just go bankrupt,  with the subsequent  loss of a much
larger number  of jobs.
Even in the absence  of any further trade liberalization,  in an efficiency-wage  setting like the one
described  above, removing  restrictions  on retrenchment  would  unambiguously  increase  the turnover  rate,
with both hiring and firing being more prevalent. Although the unemployment  rate would increase in
the short run, the average unemployment  spell would be shorter.  This would help solving the socially
explosive  problem of youth unemployment. Moreover, in a long-run  perspective  aggregate  employment
22should increase. This is because  the current costs of retrenchment  are a deterrent  for investment  in labor-
intensive  projects.
Repealing  the TWA would lead to a welfare  loss by incumbent  workers in the regulated  sector,
who are precisely the ones organized in trade unions.  In addition, there is a legitimate fear that the
greater flexibility  may be used to get rid of union activists. Since Sri Lankan unions play an important
role in the enforcement  of labor law, it could be worth addressing this second concern by protecting
elected workers' representatives  from non-disciplinary  firing, as is the case in many Western countries.
The welfare loss by incumbent  workers is much  more difficult  to address though. Because  of this loss,
the removal  of the TWA may be out of reach.  If this is so, then the set up of limits for severance pay
should be considered.22
The policy implications  of the analysis are different in the case of tea plantations. This is a
potentially  conflictive  sector, as the children  of the Indian  Tamil workers  become adults and face almost
no local labor demand. It is clear that the government  should not interfere  in wage setting by the new
private managers, beyond the enforcement  of labor standards. But the social and political implications
of massive  layoffs are unclear.  Efforts should be aimed at reallocating  workers to the few estates that
currently have excess demand for labor, at giving the private sector the long-term  horizon required to
undertake significant investments in  replanation  (which increase labor demand both  during the
replantation  process and when the new bushes  get into the production  stage), and at attracting  investnent
to the tea region under the EPZ regime.
Finally, an in-depth  revision  of both the on-going  and the proposed  vocational  training programs
seems desirable. 23 These programs are highly costly, in a context where the budget deficit is putting
a heavy burden on private sector development  (World Bank, 1993b). Moreover, they do not reduce
unemployment,  to the extent that the latter is not due to skills mismatch,  nor do they generate the skills
the private sector is looking  for.  A demand-driven  vocational  training would better achieve  the goal of
22  A second-best  approach  may also be appropriate  regarding  the simplification  of labor law in Sri Lanka.
The first best would be to replace the many intricate and even contradictory  layers of legislation  by a
much simpler labor code.  But this is likely to trigger a national  debate on the issue.  The collective
bargaining  agreement  between  the Employers' Federation  of Ceylon  and the Ceylon  Mercantile  Workers
Union, which includes  the '2 for 1" indexation  clause, is seen by many  as a model to be replicated. The
introduction  of this kind of rule in a labor code would threaten  one of the strengths of the Sri Lankan
labor market, namely the flexibility  of real wages.
23 The comprehensive  World  Bank/I.D.A. funded General  Education  Project represents  an important  step
in this direction.
23upgrading  skills in Sri Lanka. It would  also be less subject  than the current programs to the interference
of politics and patronage.
24Appendix
Equations  (6) and  (10)  can  be re-written  as follows:
WR '  F(h,r)  (Al)
h  - G(WR,r)  (A2)
Let Fh' be the partial derivative  of F(.) with respect  to h, Gw' the partial derivative  of G(.) with respect
to WR, and so on. Differentiating  the system  represented  by equations  (Al) and (A2)  and solving  for
dh and dWR  yields
Ft Gw'  +  Gr  Ft  +  Fh*Gr*
dh-  .dr  ,  dWR-  .dr  (A3)
1  - Fh  Gw  1  -Fh  Gw
where
(1-f)  (l-r)
Pr#  =  ~  G <0>O  (A4)
( l-h  ) 2f
( l-f  )h
F '  - - *  <0  (AS)
(l-h)f
rf[  (l-f)e  - f
Gw'  2<  0  (AC)
2fWR  - f  - (1-f).  I2
f (  -WR)
Gr'  >  0  (A7)
2fWR  - f  - (1-f)e
The sign of Gw' may seem a priori ambiguous. However, in equilibrium  both LR and U are positive,
so that equations (4), (7) and (8) imply WR <  I and 2fWR  - f - (1-f)e >  0; consequently,  (1-f)e - f is
negative.
25By replacing  equations  (A4) to (A7) into (A3), the following  results obtain:
dh
- >  0  (AS)
dr
dWR
Sgn(  -)  - Sgn{  (1-r)f(1-WR)  - (1-h)h(  2fWR  - f  - (1-f)e  1  }
dr
a  Sgn{  (1-r)fLR  - (1-h)hU  }
- Sgn{  I  (1-r)f  - (1-h)r  JLR )  (A9)
(see equations  (4), (7), (8) and (9)).  For r  X  0, equation (A9) implies Sgn dWR/dr m Sgn fLR >  0.
Q.e.d.
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